


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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

The Constants in French Foreign Policy

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August 1971

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THE CONSTANTS IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Directorate of Intelligence

August 1971

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

The Constants in French Foreign Policy

Summary

In the two years since Charles de Gaulle gave up the presidency, the orientation of France's foreign policy has been subject to minute scrutiny from every direction. Any hint of variation between him and his heirs and between Gaullists and other Frenchmen has been carefully sifted to determine its significance. Official statements and new expressions of policy regularly elicit wide-ranging interpretations of their import. Such concentration on inferred new directions has tended to obscure the essential unity apparent in policy tacks despite divergent political philosophies.

Interpretations originating west of the Atlantic frequently suffer because the base for comparison of French policy innovations is usually the immediate postwar period, when France regularly acquiesced in US-led containment of Soviet expansionism. Unfortunately, the early 1950s was hardly a representative era for such exegesis; the ideological atmosphere of the cold war hung heavy over Western Europe, France was struggling to recover from the effects of defeat and occupation, and Germany was impotent.

By the end of that decade, however, key aspects of the general situation had changed enormously. Cracks had begun to appear in what had been considered the monolithic world-Communist structure, the economic recovery of Western Europe was ensured, and many Europeans were beginning to express second thoughts about the desirability of perpetuating two antagonistic blocs. As a result, the world view from Paris began to return to its traditional focus.

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Going back to pre - World War II concepts, the geographic, economic, and cultural factors that color French political perceptions have long been clearly defined. For centuries France's aspirations to maritime power have been circumscribed by the prime requirement of defense against land incursions. Since 1870 this preoccupation has been reinforced by the resurgence of Germany, and the prime foreign policy objective of republican France has been to contain German expansionism. The traditional continental preoccupations of French leaders may be somewhat reoriented by the threat of nuclear weaponry, but they cannot be entirely distracted from their primordial area of concern.

As the cold war developed, France's allies tended to forget that the Western European Union had been formed in 1948 by five nations still fearful of Germany's recovery potential. The abortive European Defense Community afforded France, in the opinion of many Frenchmen, insufficient protection against Germany in a community of six. When West Germany was admitted to WEU in 1954, it was counterbalanced by the UK's adherence—to avoid any possibility that Germany might be rearmed without being restricted by sufficiently forceful international commitments.

The genesis of the other integration schemes in Western Europe was also the desire to contain German dynamism. The French-German treaty of 1963 had the same objective; De Gaulle had proposed a similar arrangement for all the governments associated in the Common Market. In each case, the intent was to inhibit possible future German aspirations to hegemony as much as to encourage Europe's economic expansion.

Most French political leaders agree that the ultimate goal of European integration is political union, but none see that objective as imminent. Until the national priorities of all the potential participants can be submerged in a continental identity, Paris will strive to retain freedom of action wherever possible. Even De Gaulle acknowledged that all states are interdependent today, but he insisted that France should retain control over policy decisions where its interests are involved and that other states should have the same prerogative.

For the foreseeable future, therefore, assessments of France's international role must start from the premise that freedom of action and defense against foreign aggression are the constants in the basic political equation. The goal is not standpat policies, but dynamic adaptation to changing circumstances.

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Paris has not always been ready to adapt as quickly as circumstances might warrant, particularly in areas where historic ties were at stake. Nevertheless, when the trend of events in other parts of the globe made clear that change was inevitable, Paris has reacted to cut French losses and to fall back to its European "hexagon."

Insofar as the world outside Europe is concerned, Paris' primary objective has been to have its voice heard in international forums on developments anywhere on the globe. Without surrendering its claim to world-wide interests, it has adjusted its relationship to areas formerly under French sovereignty; cooperation has become the catch-word for ties with its former African and Indochinese territories. The organization, in the late 1960s, of the French-speaking Countries' Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation is far less rigid than the Common Market ties to France's neighbors in Europe, but it establishes a formal relationship which ensures continuation of French influence.

Although France is now acknowledging more frankly than during the era of De Gaulle that it is limiting its major fields of international activity largely to adjacent areas and to Africa, it still proceeds on the assumption that the evolution of nuclear arms gives it wide leeway to exert influence elsewhere, too. Because a nuclear holocaust is unthinkable, French strategists argue, a moderate-sized power with access to atomic weapons can carry considerable weight in diplomatic channels. The threat of action implicit in its control over nuclear arms is sufficient to enhance its bargaining power in peacetime, even though its actual strength would be negligible in conflict.

In practical terms, French efforts to exert influence on a global scale will probably turn increasingly to the UN Security Council. Not only does its permanent seat give Paris a sense of equality with the big powers, but it also ensures France a degree of importance more and more out of proportion to its relative size and strength. Outside the UN, Paris seeks to establish good relations with the USSR and China and to retain with the US as weak an alliance as is compatible with national security. In other aspects, Paris will be inclined to look on itself as a regional rather than a world power. One indication of this tendency is the renewed interest it is showing in the Mediterranean. France is openly trying to develop a position of strength there to counter growing Soviet influence and to make up for possible dwindling US concern. Europe, the Mediterranean and, to a lesser degree, Black Africa will in the future be the areas of prime importance to Paris.

Even the most nationalistic French leaders acknowledge that the individual nation-state in Western Europe is no longer competent to deal with

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technical and economic realities. They also accept the evolution of the continent toward a new European context. Only a very small minority, however, see any early possibility that Europe can replace today's nation-states as the framework for a national culture that would provide sufficient community of identity to permit full political integration.

Pending the eventuality and as preparation for it, French spokesmen emphasize the cultural factor. If France is not to be dragged along in the wake of more powerful partners, if it is to have enough power to exert influence on world developments, they warn, it must not only work toward a wider political entity, but also strive to achieve a leadership role in such a polity. Michel Debre expressed this thought in extreme terms when he stated that unless France is essentially the dominant element in any association of European states, "it risks subordination, that is to say, disappearance." To that end, all Frenchmen stress the importance of the French language. Waning linguistic influence is viewed as reflecting, and indeed hastening, ebbing national vitality. The use of French as a vehicle for international communication is considered linked to the part France will play in a more closely knit Europe.

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A. EUROPE

In recent years both French Government officials and political activists have turned increasing attention to questions about the kind of comprehensive European community they consider most likely to ensure peace and France's long-range security interests. They have sought to define "Europe" to determine what geographical area and what peoples might reasonably be expected to find a basis for close association. They have explored what powers might safely be delegated to an association of European nations, what goals it might pursue and what steps might be taken to achieve both.

Government spokesmen have regularly expressed the need to expand European cooperation beyond the confines of the Community of Six, but they have always cautiously avoided specifying time and space coordinates for their proposals. Two unofficial bodies have been much more definite, however, about both the extent of European cooperation and the time span in which it might be effected.

In 1967, a research group of the private Foreign Policy Study Center, working under the center's Study Committee on French-German Relations, prepared a program geared to the three-stage progression from detente to entente to cooperation that De Gaulle had long propounded as the sequence through which relations with the USSR could be improved. Subsequently, the European Independence Movement, founded in 1968, has undertaken, through conferences and formal studies, to advance the idea of broad European collaboration cutting across current associational ties.

The research group granted that detente would confirm the stable situation now prevailing in Europe, but rejected it as a permanent solution to European problems. The group's conclusion was that detente would reinforce the status quo by making it impossible to eliminate the fundamental causes of tension and would ensure Western Europe's continued dependence on the US. The result, as the group saw it, would be a Soviet-American condominium over Europe, precluding a real rapprochement between the two parts of the continent; without institutional links or common political interests, the growth of trade would not be enough by itself, the group felt, to create a wider community of views.

Passing on to its understanding of what entente might encompass, the research group envisaged an initial phase contingent on the end of hostilities in Vietnam and fruitful negotiations between the two Germanys. At this

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stage both alliances could undertake to work out together a system of inspection of forces. In a second phase, mobile observation teams would inspect military contingents in Germany; nuclear arms would be withdrawn from this pilot zone and ceilings placed on conventional military units there. In a final phase, surveillance would be extended to the rest of Central Europe.

The objective of cooperation, as the research group envisioned it, would be to establish a new political system in Europe, replacing the two military alliances by a pan-European security arrangement. The goal would be to make German reunification possible by creating a new German confederation within a broader confederation embracing the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as the unaligned nations of Europe.

Although, as its name implies, the European Independence Movement (EIM) wants to free the continent from outside restraint, this does not mean that it proposes isolating from the world the "organization of European states" it hopes to create. It insists that it does not suggest renunciation of existing alliances, that it seeks only to give priority to European ties. At the same time, however, it flatly rejects the thought of a Europe - United States "partnership," and looks ultimately to a pan-European association including the USSR. Indeed, it sees the USSR as an eventual pillar corresponding to Western Europe in a purely European organization.

The EIM favors strengthening the structures of the European Common Market as a means of more closely coordinating foreign, economic, and financial policies. An independent Western Europe, it argues, is essential to the evolution of all of Europe, because the orientation of the Common Market will determine in large measure the attitude of Eastern Europe. It proposes intensified bilateral and multilateral cooperation between both parts of the continent, the withdrawal of foreign armed force from all countries concerned, and the formulation of a European security system as steps toward the ultimate goal of a united Europe open to all European states.

The EIM is supported by politically active elements ranging from the Gaullist-allied Independent Republicans to the Communists. It numbers many Socialists in its membership, but the bulk of its strength comes from the Gaullists, including ex-ministers Pierre Messmer, Alain Peyrefitte, and Jean Foyer.

EIM proponents are reluctant to specify geographic boundaries for their conception of Europe. They insist that no European system is possible

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without the USSR, but what the USSR encompasses in their minds remains unsaid. Nevertheless, the concept of a broad European setting for a solution to the problem of German reunification appeals to thoughtful Frenchmen as the only guarantee of lasting peace. The well-known theorist on strategy, General Andre Beaufre, for example, rejects the idea of a Western European community as a viable solution, arguing that only the enlargement of "Europe" to the Soviet frontier would permit both the reunification of Germany and liquidation of the issues arising from World War II.

Government officials are skeptical about the immediate practicality of such ideas, but they continue to make overtures to build links with countries outside the established Western European organizations. Defense Minister Michel Debre, long a spokesman for France's most narrowly nationalistic aspirations, continues to reject the feasibility of a political and military entity in Western Europe, let alone one covering the whole continent, because he sees little cohesion beyond present-day national boundaries. Even he, however, grants a growing awareness of a psychological affinity among Europeans which impels them to seek solutions to intra-European conflicts within a community of interests.

Debre dismisses as unrealistic for the present a policy based on extra-national loyalties, but he recognizes the progress that has been made in integrating Western European economies and accepts the desirability of concerting French policies with those of its major neighbors. Although he expresses doubts that the USSR will continue to be able to exercise control over Eastern Europe, he sees a durable basis for Moscow's overtures to Western Europe and insists that it is in France's interest to push on boldly toward entente and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

In sum, although French interests in international cooperation continue to be concentrated on the Common Market countries, Paris does not feel that European cooperation should be restricted to the area they encompass. Both De Gaulle and Pompidou, as chiefs of state, have undertaken formal visits to the USSR to make commitments for closer links between the two countries. When De Gaulle visited Poland in September 1967, he raised the hope for a "contractual settlement of the great problem of Germany, and through this the achievement by the whole continent of the security and union which it has never known."

Similarly, the communiqué issued following Premier Jacques Chaban-Delmas' visit to Yugoslavia in April 1971—the first by a head of the French Government—expressed the hope that cooperation would be reinforced

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among European countries independent of their political orientation or social structure. Both sides expressed their wish to pursue efforts to overcome the division of the continent and to pass beyond the era of antagonistic blocs.

Such overtures parallel steps Paris has taken to develop close ties on the Common Market's western flank. In recent years joint commissions have been established with Spain to coordinate cultural, scientific, technical, commercial, industrial, agricultural, and social cooperation. In February 1970, for the first time since the Spanish Civil War, the Spanish foreign minister—Lopez Bravo—visited Paris. An agreement to purchase Mirage III aircraft was reached, and subsequently a military cooperation accord providing for joint exercises and exchange of personnel was signed.

1. Roads to Unity

Whatever support may exist in France for pan-European cooperation "from the Atlantic to the Urals," proponents of early union fasten on more modest goals. Without denigrating the desirability and usefulness of individual steps to relieve tension and to forge new links with states outside the ideological barriers erected in both the Cold War and the Spanish Civil War, the cooperation-minded forces in France have tended to concentrate most of their energies on constructing the Common Market.

Even General Beaufre, who has strong reservations both about relying on economic integration as a road to political union and about attempting to establish "Europe" on too restrictive a geographic basis, thinks that it is unrealistic to believe in the possibility of unifying Europe other than by progressive stages. Failing more broadly based politico-strategic discussions and efforts to reorganize NATO, he is prepared to back integration of the Common Market Six as a preliminary step.

The authors of *The European Challenge*—Louis Armand and Michel Drancourt—espouse a variant eclectic approach that would make it possible to transcend the Europe of the Six. They propose "federalism a la carte," a selective network of agreements permitting countries to cooperate in specific fields, with varying numbers of participants according to the purpose. A federal structure, they suggest, could start with establishing a common legal basis for all the new technologies, developing in common what is too new to have yet been bound into existing patterns. They are categorical that "only federalist structures can transform the material associations between men into lasting emotional, spiritual, and political bonds."

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In his press conference in January 1971, President Pompidou expressed his conviction that only the national states—not commissions composed of technicians—can bring a European government into existence. As a means toward achieving such a government he presented an adaptation of the Fouchet Plan—named for De Gaulle's representative in Common Market negotiations a decade earlier. That proposal embodied De Gaulle's determination to safeguard France's national sovereignty as integration advanced. Pompidou envisaged an evolution during which one minister in each national government would be responsible for over-all European matters. Eventually, their duties would expand, they would be obliged to meet more and more frequently, and at some distant date they would cease to be part of their national governments: they would have become a truly European government.

Until that time, and until a real European parliament exists, important decisions can be taken only by unanimous consent of the member states. Pompidou had indicated earlier that he sees no chance of a European nation coming into being for a long time to come, and that any idea of demolishing the existing nations at the start would condemn the whole project to complete failure. He has also made clear that he was not in favor of any form of political integration of Western Europe that could place obstacles in the way of a rapprochement between the two parts of the continent.

Pompidou's admonition against early moves to weaken national identity was probably sparked by the extraordinary resurgence of regionalism in recent years, not only in France, but elsewhere in Western Europe also. Since World War II France has recognized the need for decentralization of many governmental functions and the creation of intermediate administrative entities between Paris and the *departements*, which were constituted following the overthrow of the *ancien regime*. Over the past quarter of a century superprefectures have been established, forming regional groupings of *departements*, and several overlapping patterns of regional divisions are now operating for different purposes.

It is recognized that one set of regional partitions should serve all administrative purposes, and there is general agreement on the need for France to determine new regional jurisdictions comparable to the West German *laender*, the newly constituted Italian regions, and the British Board of Trade districts. In France, most of the proposals for formal regional structures follow closely the provincial divisions of prerevolutionary days, although the basic criterion is economic. In nearly every instance some of the pressure for regional autonomy comes from groups motivated by cultural

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considerations, but the primary impulse stems not from those with a nostalgic urge to turn toward the past, but from young forward-looking elements intent on optimum exploitation of economic potential.

Should such decentralization be pursued, however, it is expected over the long run to make the *departement* an anachronistic relic between the local municipalities and the increasingly powerful regional institutions. Nationalists view such a potential development as a direct threat to the existing nation-states if, as they anticipate, the political integration of Europe evolves out of the Common Market and EURATOM.

They reason that the proposed regions would be more practicable units than the current national entities for the intermediate level of government between the local municipalities and the future confederal authority. Whereas the *departement* is proving too small an intermediate unit in the national context, they argue, the state as it exists today would in turn cease to serve a useful political function; it would survive only as a cultural framework. That possibility seems sufficiently remote to most Frenchmen to merit no consideration in negotiations on European integration, but fervent nationalists can be expected to rely increasingly on it to oppose real or potential threats to national autonomy.

2. The Common Market

After more than two decades of formal negotiations on various aspects of economic integration, France continues to demonstrate that it is not yet prepared to surrender essential facets of national sovereignty to any supranational organization. Paris follows a policy of expanding economic cooperation on a wide front, and where its interests are best served by reliance on an international forum, it is quick to press for such consideration. It recently sought European parliamentary discussion of common agricultural prices, for example, before accepting them. On the other hand, it maintains a continuing nationalistic stance vis-a-vis EURATOM.

Despite optimistic prognostications by official committees of the European Economic Community organizations, the outlook for political integration in the 1970s is dim. In 1970 a working group of high-level Common Market officials under Luxembourg Finance Minister Werner concluded that decisions on economic matters could be realized within a decade by a popularly elected European parliament. This opinion was immediately challenged by Jacques Vernant, secretary general of the Foreign Policy Study Center. Even without the adhesion of Great Britain, he believes, the transformation of the Six alone into a Western European state is a theoretical consideration without any realistic foundation.

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Vernant argues, moreover, that such close integration is no longer as desirable as it may once have appeared. One reason for that opinion is his belief—shared by most Frenchmen and their government—that the danger of Soviet aggression or Communist subversion has disappeared. In addition, he is convinced that economic stability and development cannot be guaranteed by broadening the political framework. Big business, he points out, operates satisfactorily across international borders, and—most important—the superpowers seem as subject to social and political crises as are small or middle-sized states.

However valid Vernant's analysis may be, it must be admitted that there is no assurance the piecemeal approach will lead to political unity. The need for simultaneous political and economic accord is perhaps most forcefully apparent in the area of monetary policies. Recurring monetary crises in the past few years have concentrated attention on the problems divergent currency policies among member states pose for the survival of the integration steps already taken.

France insists that the Council of Ministers from the participating countries, rather than the European Communities' Commission, play the managing role in a future monetary union; yet with a common currency Paris would face real limitations on its sovereignty. Theoretically the member states could continue to project independent budgets even if they were operating in a unified monetary area with a central bank. In practice, however, the political implications of divergent fiscal strategies would almost certainly lead to what would be essentially a common budget.

What this means is that should this stage be reached, France will have made the decision to sacrifice national autonomy. Monetary concordance is therefore likely to be as much a consequence of political union as a step toward it.

Paris should not have much difficulty in finding a basis of accord with its EEC partners in most of the remaining areas under consideration, or at least in devising ways to circumvent embarrassingly restrictive covenants. The most troublesome of these may be the energy field, which implies some restriction on sovereignty, specifically in defense matters. The solution may well have to await creation of a genuine community executive. A common transport policy, on the other hand, would presumably be no more serious a political problem to Paris than to its partners.

A common commercial policy would, of course, block the freewheeling contacts Paris and its EEC partners have sought to develop with various

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Eastern European countries. In any event, trade agreements cannot be handled indefinitely by individual countries within the Common Market. When unification of such procedures is achieved, it is likely to have more effect on French prestige than on its business interests. Trade arrangements will probably be much easier to accomplish than industrial specialization, which will involve personal as well as national prerogatives.

It is likely that Paris will be more easily moved on these questions than on agricultural policy, which has absorbed a disproportionate share of the time, money, and attention of all the countries participating in the Common Market. The price support program instituted at French insistence has imposed an unhealthy financial burden on the community and has created unwieldy agricultural surpluses. Presumably steps must be taken eventually to distinguish the marketing problem from social welfare considerations by retraining or pensioning farmers no longer able to compete. Some such solution can probably be worked out over the long run without arousing the strong emotional reactions that made agricultural policy a critical issue in the early 1960s.

The lure of the British market for continental farm produce has had some weight in softening the French Government's opposition to the UK as a partner in the EEC. The reality may fall short of the French hope, of course, because the technically advanced British farmers will increase their production of competitive items to take advantage of the common agricultural policy. Over the long run, however, agricultural problems will probably play only a minor role in France's attitude toward Britain's place in Europe.

Regardless of how well-founded the suspicions of the French Government have been in the past of the degree of commitment London was prepared to make to the integration movement, Paris now is convinced that Britain has demonstrated its intentions by positive actions. Some of the British moves may seem minor, but their psychological moment cannot be discounted. The conversion to decimal measurement and monetary systems, the decision to adopt a value-added taxation program, and steps toward reforming the agricultural price support system drastically altered the outlook on the French side of the Channel.

Probably the most persuasive indicator, however, was Britain's willingness to accept the Rome treaty and its subsequent elaboration, asking only for time to work out transition problems. In French eyes this expression of intent reversed the attitude Britain had displayed in refusing to participate in the Coal-Steel Community in 1950, in the proposed European Defense Community in 1953, and in EURATOM and the Common Market in 1957.

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With fear of disruptive tactics on the UK's part dispelled, Paris was ready to give more weight to its long-standing apprehensions about both extension of the economic community's authority and German preponderance in the community. Paris made its point on the first question in 1966, when it blocked the attempt by its partners to implement the majority rule called for in the Rome treaty, and subsequently other member states availed themselves of the same prerogative. Nevertheless, France has felt isolated in its insistence on unanimity for important decisions, and it looks to the UK to reinforce its position by showing similar reserve on majority rule.

The traditional French preoccupation with Germany's role in Europe is also of major importance in this context. Although Paris encourages Bonn's rapprochement with Moscow, earlier fear of German-Russian collusion has not been entirely dissipated. Regardless of France's benign attitude toward Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik, therefore, a closer link to Britain has become increasingly attractive to France. The reassurance that would be provided by a British counterbalance to German dynamism has overcome French qualms over the possibility that the UK would hold the balance of power in a confrontation between Bonn and Paris, and might on occasion incline toward West Germany.

France is increasingly prepared to take the risk in view of West Germany's economic resurgence. Although the French and West German economies have been growing at similar rates, West Germany's larger population, increasing independence and assertiveness, and especially its greater international economic reputation have enhanced fears that inevitably Bonn could be expected to take the ascendancy in an association limited to the six original Common Market countries. With Britain formally committed to the integration organizations, Paris can be expected to accede more readily to coordinated efforts in foreign policy because it can hope to rely on Britain to brake possible German aspirations to broader power.

Finally, because Paris and London retain certain prerogatives—vestiges of former world-wide pre-eminence—they may see some advantages in supporting each other's pretensions to a more prestigious status than that of the other Western European countries. Both are permanent members of the UN Security Council, both can still lay claim to some degree of global influence because of close ties with their former colonies, both are nuclear powers, and both still have formal responsibility in two areas of direct concern to all Germans: reunification and Berlin. Perhaps most important for the long-range prospects for political unity and European independence, the nucleus of a modern defense system for Western Europe is implicit in closer French-British relations.

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Two remaining areas of concern will preoccupy France for some time after the question of the UK's accession to the European communities is settled: the international role of sterling and the outlook for the French language. Because London has indicated that it is prepared to close out the use of sterling as a reserve currency, this problem can probably be solved to the satisfaction of Paris without undue strain.

The language question touches deeper emotions. Within the Six, French has played a major role. With the entry of the UK, and particularly if Norway, Denmark and Ireland follow, the pre-eminence of English will be inevitable. The almost universal reliance on English in international business, and its accelerated use as the preferred vehicle for scientific communication make certain that French will be challenged as the medium of diplomatic intercourse in an expanded Common Market.

3. Eastern Europe

The accession of the UK to the EEC can go a long way toward cementing the reconciliation France has sought with Germany by reducing French fear of German hegemony in Western Europe. As Herve Alphand, secretary general of the Foreign Ministry reminded the official Advanced Studies Institute for National Defense in 1967, the will to reconcile France and Germany is the basic reason for France's European initiative. British accession leaves indeterminate, however, a key factor which Michel Debre cited in 1970 that France must make a great effort to achieve a cooperative relationship with Germany because such a relationship was indispensable to France's security as well as to the security of the continent.

France is acutely alive to the problem of a divided Germany. On his visit to Poland in 1967, De Gaulle spoke of the division of Germany as "an abnormal situation which must be resolved." Reunification, he said, "is a matter for the Germans themselves," within the framework of an agreement between "the West, the Center, and the East of Europe." In other words, Paris looked then and still looks for an eventual solution of the German question within a context wide enough to include Eastern Europe and in particular within an arrangement acceptable to the USSR.

When Pompidou visited Moscow in 1970, he reaffirmed France's dedication to the goals of detente, entente, and cooperation that his predecessor had stressed. He signed a protocol intended to give fresh impetus to French-Soviet political cooperation by reaffirming the special ties established by De Gaulle's visit in 1966 in the economic, scientific, technological, and cultural

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fields. The agreement calls for efforts to concert the positions of the two countries on all aspects of situations that create a threat to peace and for consultations on major international problems of mutual interest. The two foreign ministers are to meet when necessary—"in principle, twice a year."

Following De Gaulle's call for increased cooperation, on his visit to Moscow in 1966, a definite intensification in French-Soviet relations has been apparent. Until then, the five-year trade agreement concluded in 1964 had done little to increase exchanges between the two countries, but by 1969 trade had tripled, due in large part to Soviet orders for capital goods. These sales gave France a favorable balance with the USSR for the first time in years. The renewal signed in 1969 anticipates that, trade will amount to \$1.4 billion in 1974, double its present volume. Paris hopes that Russian orders for consumer goods will swell in the late 1970s.

The joint permanent commission that was created to encourage French-Soviet exchanges following De Gaulle's visit gains special importance in this context. After its first session, steps were taken to implement an agreement to set up Renault production lines in the USSR, to establish a French factory in the USSR to make television tubes, and to provide for cooperation in nuclear physics. Subsequently, the commission expanded Renault's role, and attention was turned to bringing other European countries into major industrial projects, particularly in the automotive field. The 1969 accord called for France to import Soviet industrial goods as well as raw materials, and Soviet organizations are participating in the construction of a metallurgical complex near Marseilles.

The development of cooperation between the USSR and France in industrial undertakings may later encourage broader European participation. Moscow has pressed for markets in France for Soviet-built equipment and industrial products to avoid balance-of-payment difficulties. Over the short term, however, no great expansion of trade is in prospect in this field.

On the scientific side, France and the USSR have cooperated on programs to measure upper-air temperatures. Although the first plan for the USSR to launch a French-made satellite was canceled for financial reasons, this setback has been overshadowed by successful launches in the past two years, highlighted by the landing of French laser reflectors on the moon in 1970. Paris reportedly offered Moscow the use of a site near the French Guiana complex for a Soviet receiving and directional station which could benefit from an equatorial location.

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Paris leaves no doubt about the eventual political goal it seeks to attain by such efforts toward expanded cooperation with Moscow. France takes credit for hastening the relaxation of tensions in Europe in recent years, but stresses that lasting peace cannot be guaranteed until major sources of discontent have been eliminated. Germany is the core problem, and Alphand, in his speech to the military staff college, said that the moves toward cooperation between East and West that France had initiated must be expanded to bring about the conditions required for reuniting Germany. Both Debre and Pompidou have made clear in the past year that German reunification must take place within a framework of European states acting in concert. They reject the idea of competing blocs, proclaiming that the essential consideration for France is to maintain its freedom of action. Although they hasten to add that they have no intention of sacrificing ties with the US, they make clear that they want to be able to implement their own desires independently to the fullest extent possible.

The vehicle that the French now favor for furthering understanding on the continent is a conference of all the states with a stake in a European settlement—including the US and Canada. In his visit to the USSR in 1970, Pompidou reversed the position France had held earlier and expressed strong support for the European security conference concept Moscow has been pushing for years. He called for an "active phase" of preparations, which he said meant speaking of a security conference "as something that is going to happen."

Pompidou's statement reflects broad opinion in France that wider contacts with the USSR and the other states of Eastern Europe have contributed considerably to reducing tension in Europe. The distrust aroused by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 set back detente sentiment only temporarily, and relations between Paris and Moscow have gone on as if nothing had disturbed them. Even insistence on some progress in discussions on the status of Berlin no longer seems as important a prerequisite as it did at the end of 1970, although at the NATO meeting in June 1971 France reaffirmed its commitment. Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas and Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann had linked the two questions in 1970, Schumann proposing that the US, the USSR, France and the UK call on the Germans—including the Berliners—to work out proposals to be approved by the Four. In January 1971, Pompidou implied that one problem need not necessarily depend on the other, although subsequently he qualified his position considerably without retracting completely. Simultaneous discussions may be the solution, but in any event, Paris can be expected to persist in seeking to expand cooperation between both parts of Europe in as many fields as possible.

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B. DEFENSE

The premise that no country can claim to have an authentic foreign policy unless it has an independent means of defense has been so closely identified with Gaullism that its origins in pre-Gaullist France are frequently overlooked. The Fourth Republic's acceptance—albeit reluctant—of NATO's integrated military instrument is usually contrasted with De Gaulle's insistence on freedom of action in the realm of defense. Yet, the Fourth Republic's aversion to submerging the national military force in a European defense community scheme was a major blow to US policy in the early 1950s. Moreover, the Fourth Republic not only launched France's atomic energy program, but also made the decisions to channel it toward nuclear-weapon development.

There is no question but that the Fifth Republic has been far more forthright than its predecessor in proclaiming its determination to defend the nation's sovereignty. It has not, however, rejected the alliance framework formalized by the pre-Gaullist regime. De Gaulle's decision to withdraw from NATO's integrated military command was strictly within the limitations of the alliance treaty, and—most important—it was backed by a majority of the French people, who as a result of France's suffering in two world wars, were convinced that in matters of defense, there is no substitute for self-reliance.

In any event, Gaullists are still dominant, and they make clear that they consider defense a basic responsibility of the state, which can surrender no element of sovereignty in this area. Defense Minister Debre defined the coverage of his policy in 1970: "Nuclear retaliation capability, territorial defense capability, intervention capability beyond our frontiers, in Europe first of all, then in the Mediterranean and outside Europe, and finally the requisite scientific and industrial capability."

Integration of French armed forces in supranational organizations is, therefore, rejected, and emphasis is placed on providing the nation's military components with the most modern weapons available. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that when opponents of the government pose objections to the nuclear-weapons program, they usually couch them in economic terms rather than posit them on military grounds.

Nuclear parity between the US and the USSR has strengthened France's determination to develop an independent capability in modern weaponry. French spokesmen reason that the US could not be expected to risk Soviet attack on American territory by launching nuclear weapons against the

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USSR if the Russians moved on Western Europe. The "nuclear risk is not divisible," Debre wrote in *Foreign Affairs* in April 1971, "it is so enormous that a people would accept it only as a final defense of their supreme self-interest—their existence as an independent and sovereign state."

Debre went on to argue that any attempt to determine in advance the conditions under which the nuclear weapon would be used restricts its credibility as a deterrent. The decision can only be made by one nation, therefore, and no ally can expect that its interests will be given equal priority with those of the state that has the responsibility and the capability to fire the weapon.

An additional consideration for Paris is the prestige factor; possession of an independent nuclear-weapon force justifies the special status France enjoys in the UN because of its permanent seat on the Security Council.

1. Defense Doctrine

France's declared basis for its military policy is to forestall the outbreak of hostilities. President Pompidou told the Advanced Studies Institute of National Defense in 1969 that national defense is based on dissuasion. He credits France with originating the concept when French atomic weapons came into being. In French strategic thinking, possession of nuclear weapons is a particularly effective defense for a small- or medium-sized power against aggression on the part of a superpower. The French argue that the Russians would not consider France a sufficient stake to warrant risking the destruction of even part of their own industrial potential.

Despite the fundamental consonance of views between the US and France on the dissuasive role of nuclear weapons, Paris has differed drastically with Washington on the circumstances under which it sees an attack might be launched. Paris has felt that flexible response is a luxury it can ill afford, given its geographic proximity to the most likely source of aggression. Washington can reflect on the seriousness of a threat from a distant enemy, but France must decide with much less lead time.

This divergence in viewpoints has been accentuated by the limited range of the French nuclear arsenal, and there are some indications that France may be inclined to adopt a limited flexible response once it has control over its own tactical missiles with nuclear explosives. By late 1972, when such weapons are expected to be deployed, Paris presumably will follow a more relaxed policy. In the meantime, it seems clear that Paris feels confident enough of its present and potential capabilities in the area of over-all defense

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to modify considerably the hard-line self-sufficiency expressed most forcefully by the late General Charles Ailleret in his official capacity as chief of staff of the armed forces.

Questioning the West's continued adherence to the philosophy that brought the Atlantic Alliance into being, Ailleret took the position in 1967 that the danger of a Soviet attack was becoming increasingly hypothetical and that Moscow could no longer be considered the only potential aggressor, nor even the prime one, that France might have to contend with. Citing the rapid development of missile and satellite technology, he emphasized that France was vulnerable to attack from any place in the world and should, therefore, be prepared to respond in all directions with weapons capable of reaching the remotest corner of the globe.

But even before De Gaulle relinquished power, official spokesmen had backed away publicly from the idea of immediate massive nuclear retaliation and from the idea of equal alertness to attack from all directions. In 1968, the then defense minister, Pierre Messmer, expressed the desirability of the armed forces attempting to determine the real intentions of an aggressor. He cited tactical atomic weapons as the cheapest and most effective means to that end.

In early 1969, Ailleret's successor, General Michel Fourquet, introduced a further cautionary note. In an address before the Advanced Studies Institute of National Defense he reiterated that French forces must be prepared to act independently, but he also made clear that the major concern for France was still an attack from the East. Because such an attack, he said, would be met in cooperation with France's allies, a flexible response would be possible. He maintained, nevertheless, that the level at which atomic weapons should be brought into play was still a matter of profound concern for the French.

Essentially, then, in the official French view, the center of discord between France and its major ally is the threshold beyond which nuclear missiles would be employed. Pending French control of its own tactical nuclear weapons, Paris will be governed by the kind of NATO tactical-weapon support its troops could expect to rely on.

No closer rapprochement with NATO's integrated military arm is implied by willingness on the part of Paris to envisage such reliance—which in effect is no more than an acknowledgement of the existing situation. It can be assumed, however, that Paris is not unalterably opposed to an eventual European defense organization, and both the prospect of a heavier financial

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burden for defense and of the accession of the UK to the Common Market reopen the possibility that France would be prepared to explore such a solution.

Alphand raised the question before the Defense Institute in 1967, and preoccupation with the idea of French participation in a European defense organization is evident in the concern over the large percentage of the defense budget devoted to the development of the strategic forces often expressed by proponents of the national conventional forces. Furthermore, French military analysts see an increase in the value of dissuasion in a force supported by and committed to the defense of all of Western Europe. They have long warned against Western European emphasis on conventional forces, arguing that such a buildup implies uncertainty on willingness to use nuclear weapons and, therefore, means weakening the dissuasive force in Russian eyes.

At least, for the intermediate future, however, the answer is still in Michel Debre's conviction, as expressed in the *Foreign Affairs* article, that without political unity, no European nuclear strategy is possible. Until then, defense can be ensured only on a national basis.

2. NATO

In French eyes, the Atlantic Alliance is no more than a useful basis for cooperation among a number of countries that draw mutual advantages from their association. It is not an indissoluble union, although, as then Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville expressed it in 1966, it should continue to exist for years to come because it is a factor of equilibrium and consequently of peace in a disordered world.

Its "military and administrative expression," as Couve's colleague, former Defense Minister Pierre Messmer put it, is another matter. Couve drew a sharp distinction between the two, and President Pompidou holds firm to the decision De Gaulle took to withdraw French forces from the NATO command and to ask that foreign troops and facilities be removed from French soil. That decision was inevitable, he told the Advanced Studies Institute in March, 1971, from the moment France was able to construct from its own human and material resources an independent nuclear weapons system. France had the duty, he repeated, to maintain its freedom of choice and to remain independent in relation to the two military blocs.

The defense of France will be primarily the responsibility of the French nation, at least well into the next century, Defense Minister Michel Debre

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wrote in 1970. Cooperation with other nations is an indispensable element for industrial progress in strategic matters, and alliances may, depending on events, lead to mutually profitable associations. For the foreseeable future, however, France itself has the task of defending French material and spiritual interests.

The dire consequences French official spokesmen profess to foresee in a close-knit military association were summed up by General Ailleret in his 1967 analysis of France's defensive stance. Even in the case of potential Soviet aggression, which is the basis for the existence of the Alliance, France would be robbed of its freedom of action and, therefore, of its independence, he prophesied, because its defense would depend entirely on the US. French forces would be ordered into action by decisions arrived at by American generals, not by French officers responding to directives from Paris. Frenchmen would be the front-line foot soldiers, Americans the relatively secure manipulators of highly mechanized equipment that would be the decisive element.

Ailleret envisioned three additional situations in which France could be the victim of rash trust in a military association wherein the power of decision would be beyond French control. First is the possibility that "the Alliance or its most powerful member" might decide not to defend France, particularly in a situation that did not conform to the requirements of the treaty. Secondly, if an ally became involved in a war that was not the result of Soviet aggression, operations could conceivably be launched from French soil, or France and French forces might be the object of attack from the enemy of France's ally. France would be involved willy-nilly in a conflict outside its interests. Finally, even without any question of operations from French bases, preventive moves by the enemy of an ally could ravage France and decimate its population.

Such apprehensions help explain the insistence of government spokesmen on the removal of NATO installations from French soil. Cabinet members under De Gaulle stressed the infringement on national sovereignty represented by foreign bases during a protracted period when the threat of attack seemed increasingly remote. They somewhat softened the force of their refusal to continue to harbor allied troops by implying that in the event of actual hostilities, a closely integrated system would be acceptable. Until then, however, they rejected any attempt to implement peace-time planning—at least on an integrated level.

Underlying the determined opposition France expressed against peace-time integration of military forces is the conviction that alliances are

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temporary responses to passing problems. Because France is proceeding on the assumption that the decision to use nuclear weapons cannot be shared, the military association that would make a nuclear-based alliance practicable would have to be complete integration, that is, the creation of a community equivalent to a nation-state. Failing that ideal, alliances in the nuclear age are necessarily less stable than in earlier ages.

Given the likelihood that the interests of different members of the Atlantic Alliance may change over a period of time, links should be kept as loose as possible, and the possibility of withdrawal should be ensured. Since De Gaulle's rejection of military integration, the question of recasting the form of the Alliance has received less attention than it did in the mid-1960s.

It is probably relevant, however, to an appreciation of the problem to remember that fervent anti-Gaullist proponents of NATO were also insistent on reassessing the structure of the organization and the manner in which it functioned. By the mid-1960s few were as unrealistic in their appraisal of the relationships involved as was prewar premier Paul Reynaud when he proposed that France offer to accept an integrated Atlantic Community in the expectation that the US would make available to Paris all information necessary for nuclear-weapon construction.

Others, equally convinced of the value of the Alliance, rejected those aspects of the relationship that subordinated European unity to the Atlantic concept. General Andre Beaufre propagandized forcefully for a reorganization of NATO to create a specifically European component capable of bearing equal weight in the "two-pillar" concept identified with President Kennedy. Government spokesmen dismissed such ideas as illusory, maintaining that the proposed European pillar would be unable to maintain equality with the US. Nevertheless, the idea of European cooperation in the area of defense is a hardy perennial whose roots cannot be severed from the dream of political as well as economic integration.

3. European Cooperation for Defense

Although France continues to plan its military programs in terms of national capabilities, it must in the not-too-distant future prepare to seek much closer cooperation than now prevails with its neighbors in defense matters. There has been a decreasing sense of urgency since the 1950s in regard to the danger of military aggression; in fact, the stability evident throughout Western Europe has fostered widespread complacency. Nevertheless, growing pressure in the US for a reduction in American forces abroad and the prospect of much more onerous costs for new armaments can be


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expected to accelerate efforts to base Western Europe's defense on coordinated indigenous efforts. Ultimately the answer must be a European nuclear force.

Probably only the abrupt withdrawal of US troops now in Germany could galvanize Paris to a rapid reappraisal of its current policies. The loss of the US troops in Germany would not only remove a buffer for France, but also would pose a strategic problem Paris has heretofore been able to side step. France itself simply lacks sufficient geographic area for the type of defense system now considered essential to its security. Only an accord with neighboring states can provide adequate protection.

Financial considerations will also be important factors in inducing France to seek closer defense ties with its neighbors. Although France probably has the means to keep its nuclear weaponry abreast of Soviet defense capabilities—both in financial and technological resources—spreading the burden and broadening the technical base hold continuing attraction. Cooperation with the UK and with West Germany could also, of course, meet a major political objective.



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Such technological cooperation on an ad hoc basis would be a logical sequence to British adhesion to the Common Market. It could be part of the natural development of a European Common Market for armaments, as economic integration advanced. Ultimately, of course, the question of integrated defense must be posed, and Paris remains adamant against facing this problem without a corresponding political framework.

The catalyst might be Germany. If US influence in Europe declines further, particularly through a pullback of American troops, Bonn will feel increasingly thrown on its own resources. To prevent any temptation on the part of West Germany to venture into nuclear weaponry on its own, France and Britain will be under strong pressure to come to an agreement on a Western European arrangement. Defense needs could speed up European unity moves immeasurably.

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In 1969, when Franz-Josef Strauss was Bonn's finance minister, he took advantage of a visit to London to reopen the question of a European nuclear force based on the fusion of existing French and British elements. He has long insisted on the eventual necessity for Europe to look to its own defense, although until recently few of his compatriots have exhibited much enthusiasm for the idea. Washington's reassessment of the US military posture in Europe is forcing Bonn to reconsider its options, and Strauss may find wider support for his European outlook than in the past.

Both the French President and his prime minister are on record in favor of close ties with the UK in the military field. In his election campaign and subsequently Pompidou has expressed his readiness to discuss with London a common nuclear defense policy. He cautions, however, that a European agreement in this field will take time, and particularly that a political consensus is a prerequisite. Jacques Chaban-Delmas, after becoming prime minister, took the public position that once the UK acceded to the Common Market, an agreement on nuclear matters could be reached, "seriously modifying the conditions of our national effort, which would cease to be national and would become European."

At the moment, then, there is increasingly open recognition of the eventual necessity for Western Europe to take full responsibility for its own defense. If there is still no likelihood that France would participate in a closely integrated defense system without prior creation of a political unit closely enough integrated to be generally recognized as a sovereign federation, at least there is now wider acceptance of such a goal.

4. Arms

Despite forebodings about the ability of the French economy to support the weapons program laid on under the Fifth Republic, cost has not deterred the government from its goals. Indeed, what slippage has occurred has been more the result of a reordering of priorities than of financial stringencies or even technological lag. In the early 1960s, there was some slight support in France for spreading armament construction among the Common Market countries, both to encourage technological innovation and to cut costs. In practice, however, the national economy has benefited considerably as a result of the spinoff from scientific progress. The French electronics and aerospace industries, especially, have flourished and have now become the foremost in Western Europe. The most spectacular evidence of French technological growth has been the expansion of arms sales abroad.

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Sales nearly tripled from 1965 to 1970, putting France in third place, behind the US and the USSR, in arms exports.

Aircraft accounted for over 70 percent of the nearly \$1.5 billion earned in 1970 from armament sales abroad. Mirage sales alone have averaged 100 units per year since 1960, and many more are now on order. Missile-launching patrol boats are in increasing demand. Defense Minister Debre insists that the absence of political conditions makes French equipment attractive to many foreign countries. In light of the French embargo on arms to Israel and the restrictions placed on Libya's use of the Mirages it bought, Debre presumably means that such limitations do not constitute a quid pro quo for receiving the equipment.

There is no likelihood that Paris would add nuclear weapons to its foreign sales stock. Although France refuses to sign the nonproliferation treaty, the French ambassador to the UN assured the General Assembly in 1968 that his country would conduct itself in the future exactly the same as the states that decided to adhere to it—except of course, for inspection. On testing, however, Paris refuses either to sign the accord banning explosives in the atmosphere or to comply with its provisions. Its position is that the ban does not eliminate the nuclear threat and is essentially a subterfuge to protect the lead the two superpowers have in the nuclear-weapon field.

The official French position on nuclear disarmament continues to be the policy De Gaulle laid down in 1958, when he said that the only solution is to stop bomb production, destroy existing stocks, and establish effective international control to prevent violation of the agreement. Paris favors discussions among the five nuclear powers as a step toward disarmament. It is cool to proposals for mutual balanced force reduction, however, because of the bloc-to-bloc framework in which talks on the proposal would be held. Even without French suspicion of discussions in which Washington and Moscow would be the major spokesmen for opposing sides, Paris is probably reluctant to undertake negotiations that might oblige it to cut back its conventional forces.



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still the largest in Western Europe. Moreover, for reasons of prestige as well as a guarantee of influence in Black Africa, the intervention force that was devised when the former overseas territories were declared independent retains its relatively modest claim on the budget.

The outlook in defense matters continues to be Gaullist, therefore, not only in the broad context in which the General stressed national freedom of action, but also in the specific areas of military decision. Types of force, armament, and arms production, and particularly disarmament will be determined within a frame of reference that will require minute attention to the implications any change may have for French national interests.

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C. THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN

Quickening French interest in the Mediterranean, which has been apparent since the mid-1960s, is a result of a convergence of economic, military, political, and cultural factors both at home and abroad. De Gaulle's dramatization of some aspects of these developments initially obscured their intrinsic importance to French national purposes, but subsequently the pattern has emerged in sharp focus. In mid-1969, at his first press conference as president, Pompidou proclaimed France's intention to defend its moral and material rights in the Mediterranean Basin. French interests there are both extensive and diverse, he stated, and depend on good relations with the Arab nations.

Strategic considerations had probably been paramount in De Gaulle's mind when he laid the basis for the Mediterranean policy his successor has now expanded. Pompidou may attach less immediate importance than his predecessor to military planning and logistics, but he is at least as alert to French industry's growing dependence on outside sources of energy. For both De Gaulle and Pompidou the prime objective has been to forestall any possibility that France's freedom of action might be curtailed by another country's control over essential gas and petroleum supplies.

Petroleum accounts for about ten percent of France's imports and over half of French energy consumption. Most of the French oil supply has come from Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. De Gaulle's concern from the beginning was based in considerable part on the overwhelming influence of British and American companies in the production of petroleum. He feared that expanding demand accelerated by anticipated greatly amplified needs of the Communist world would threaten France's sources in any event, and he was particularly apprehensive that growing animosity in Arab lands toward Britain and the US would further restrict French supplies. Hence Paris has pressed for French participation in oil exploitation in Algeria and Libya in order to ensure a role in production as close to home as possible; at the same time it has sought more insistently for a foothold in the major producing countries in the Middle East.

France has high hopes, also, for the market possibilities the oil-producing countries represent for modern equipment. The complementary relationship that French business interests could exploit is an increasingly frequent theme, sparked by the foreign exchange imbalance resulting from massive oil imports. French goods have been increasingly popular in the Arab

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world since the Six-Day War of 1967, and Paris feels that continuing poor relations between the Arabs and the "Anglo-Saxons" are bound to benefit the French export pattern. France can provide the Arab world with practically all it needs for modernization and development, the argument runs, in exchange for petroleum.

French industry has become increasingly dependent on oil imports, practically all by way of the Mediterranean—44 million tons through Lebanon and Syria, 27 million tons from Algeria, and 17 million from Libya in 1970—and Paris has become correspondingly nervous over the growing Soviet naval presence in these waters. France, as the major power in the Mediterranean Basin, is particularly sensitive to the military importance of the area. On his visit to the US in 1970, Pompidou defended the sale of Mirages to Libya on the grounds that France could not afford to ignore the countries on the southern shores of the sea that formed Europe's "soft underbelly" from which an attack might be launched. Of more immediate concern for Paris, of course, is the importance of air and sea lanes for access to the African states with which it maintains close ties as well as to its remaining possessions in Africa and in the Indian Ocean. The French position is that there can be no security for Europe if the other shore of the Mediterranean is hostile or if powers foreign to the area create tensions there that polarize the states bordering on the sea.

It is noteworthy that the National Defense Advanced Studies Institute has taken the initiative in exploring the industrial potential of the area. In 1970 it organized a conference of public and private interests to consider possibilities for industrial development, particularly in southern France. With cheap energy now available for areas previously handicapped by the absence of coal and iron, France sees wide opportunities for industrialization and, through French expertise and equipment, the creation of new markets.

The hope of Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann that France will serve as a center of attraction for nonaligned states in the context of a European security conference also buoys up French aspirations in the Mediterranean. President Pompidou has emphasized France's intention "to maintain the closest, the best relations possible with all our Mediterranean neighbors without exception." France expects to be able to penetrate the area more readily by stressing that cooperation does not imply subservience to an ideological program. The theme pushed by the European Independence Movement is that the renaissance of a true community around the Mediterranean Basin would be a decisive factor in promoting world stability as well as the independence of Europe. To achieve these ends, France is seeking political and cultural as well as economic cooperation with its Mediterranean neighbors.

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1. The Western Mediterranean

Since Michel Debre took over the Defense Ministry he has insistently stressed the role France intends to play in the Mediterranean. Just as France has undertaken genuine cooperation with Germany, he states, it is adopting a policy of genuine cooperation with its neighbors in the Western Mediterranean, despite differences in race, religion, and economic systems. Paris must be alert, he says, to see that its demands are respected, at least in the Western Mediterranean. French relations with Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, as well as with Spain and Italy, he asserts, are taking on an importance that can only increase over the coming years.

At the end of 1969, Paris announced that full diplomatic relations were to be renewed with Morocco. Relations were interrupted in 1965, after a prominent member of the Moroccan nationalist opposition disappeared mysteriously in France under circumstances that implicated a high Moroccan Government official. For nearly four years the respective ambassadorial posts remained vacant, and French economic and military assistance programs were cut back. Cultural relations were not disturbed, however, and thousands of French teachers remained on the job. As of mid-1971, France was increasing its economic and military aid, although it is still below 1966 levels.

Relations with Tunisia have also been on the mend since the low point in 1964 when President Bourguiba nationalized the last of the French-owned farms there. Before De Gaulle left office he had invited Bourguiba to visit Paris, and Pompidou renewed the invitation. Although the nationalization measures resulted in a loss of tariff and quota advantages to Tunisia—as well as of direct aid—cultural and technical cooperation was largely unaffected, and a preferential tariff was reinstituted in 1966.

Algeria's oil resources make it both more attractive to France than its two neighbors and more difficult to deal with. The basis of cooperation is the Evian agreement of 1962, as modified by a petroleum accord in 1965. Even when negotiations on oil reached an impasse in February 1971, Paris stated its intention to continue cultural and technical aid. It announced, however, that the special status Algeria had enjoyed would no longer prevail and that aid programs would henceforth be on the same contractual terms as those to other countries.

Here again, despite the government's inability to reach an accord on oil production, it continued to implement the cultural and technical accords,

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and to import liquified natural gas from Algeria. The oil companies were obliged to contrive their own accommodation with Algiers, and one of the two major French oil producers soon signed a joint-venture agreement accepting minority-partner status. The other will probably negotiate a similar agreement. Settlement of the oil problems may presage continuation of credits France had made available for industrial development, although probably not at the exceptionally low interest rates that had prevailed before 1971.

Throughout the Maghreb, French is still the language of the educated classes and of instruction. Paris can be expected to support education in the three countries by furnishing teachers, particularly at secondary and higher levels, as long as the local governments will permit the teaching of French and of other subject matter in French. French policy in this regard is influenced not only by the desire to keep French culture alive in these countries but also to preserve the French role elsewhere on the globe—particularly in Black Africa and in the UN.

2. Middle East

The emotions aroused by the attitude of De Gaulle toward Israel in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 have tended to obscure the rationale for French policy in the Eastern Mediterranean since then. Paris does not question the right of Israel to exist as an independent state. It points to the role played by both the Fourth and Fifth French republics in providing the Israelis with the armaments that ensured their success in combat.

The French position is that after 1967 Israel destroyed the delicate equilibrium on which its lasting existence depends. Since the Six-Day War, the Arabs have been the weaker of the two antagonists, and France insists that the least it can do is to prevent a further expansion of Israel's military superiority. The continuing conflict in the Middle East has endangered European security, Paris argues, by provoking antagonistic blocs and encouraging the intervention of the two superpowers in the Mediterranean.



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On a purely commercial basis, France has fared better by limiting its arms sales to Israel than had it continued to be the Israelis' major supplier. Aside from arms, France's exports to Israel were small. It had imported a sizable quantity of citrus fruit, but the value of that trade was minimal compared to the oil shipments from Arab countries. With petrochemical products accounting for almost half the value of France's industrial production, the decision of Paris to take pains to protect the source of raw materials was predictable. Moreover, the vast needs of the producing countries for developmental equipment held out the promise of a continuing outlet for French-made machinery.

Since 1967, Paris has insisted that peace be re-established in the Middle East on the basis of the UN Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967, which essentially would oblige Israel to evacuate occupied territory in return for recognition of its right to exist and to navigate in nearby international waters. France has formally proposed that the Big Four undertake, within the framework of the Security Council, to seek a way to implement the resolution. In addition, to ensure lasting peace in the area, the French Government has repeatedly emphasized the necessity of a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem.

The obverse of the rigid attitude toward Israel is evident in France's readiness to make aircraft available to Arab states other than those directly involved in hostilities. The cash value of the Mirages Paris has sold Libya is probably a secondary consideration compared to the long-range economic and cultural advantages that may ensue. France failed to consummate the oil concession it had hoped to work out with Iraq at the same time as the aborted plane deal, but it has at least established a basis for further expansion of French influence.

D. WORLD-WIDE INTERESTS

The emphasis on domestic problems that accompanied the departure of De Gaulle and the concentration of the Pompidou regime on developments close to home in Europe and in the Mediterranean aroused some initial expectation that France would be less concerned in the future with broad international issues. Subsequently, however, Pompidou has demonstrated his intention to follow through on the major aspects of his predecessor's foreign policy concerns outside Europe. The scope of his activities may be less grandiose, but the basic intent to make France's influence felt will prevail.

In three specific fields of action continuity is increasingly apparent. The first is in Black Africa and in France's remaining overseas territories. The second is in the UN, where France's permanent seat on the Security Council is a precious badge of global importance. The third is France's relationship with the US, which Paris is prepared to tailor to shifts of power in global alignments. Once peace is restored in Southeast Asia, Paris can be expected to seek to shore up at least its cultural influence there.

1. Black Africa and the Overseas Territories

Pompidou's visit in early 1971 to five of France's former dependencies south of the Sahara had more than symbolic value; it confirmed the French Government's intention to consolidate and expand its aid program in the area. The symbolism must not be discounted, however, because it emphasizes the cultural affinity through which Paris hopes to retain a global role for the French language. France probably derives a net financial gain from its outlays in Black Africa, but economic profit is not the major advantage it anticipates from the ties it works so hard to maintain with these countries.

France is more keenly alert than most other nations to the leverage to be gained from cultural dominance. Particularly as the number of native French-speaking populations has declined, Paris has looked to ways to counter the ascendancy of other languages—and English in particular—in international use. The Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation among French-speaking countries that was formalized in 1969 will be an important vehicle for French-language propaganda in much of Africa.

The Pompidou regime has made clear that it intends to follow through on the accords De Gaulle reached with most of France's former colonies in Black Africa. These provide for a wide range of technical assistance, but they

also put at France's disposal airfields and ports in strategic locations and ensure France transit rights over large areas of the continent. Similar ties may never be attained with Belgium's former African territories, but Paris is making strenuous efforts to align these countries as closely as possible in cultural patterns at least. General Mobutu's official visit to France in 1971 was hailed in Paris as a prelude to increased cooperation with Congo-Kinshasa.

If anything, Paris tends now to see a more important international role for its possessions elsewhere on the globe than during De Gaulle's presidency. Paris is continuing to develop its nuclear test facilities in the Pacific and its space-launch complex in French Guiana. Perhaps of equal significance from a military point of view is the emphasis France is placing on its naval stations in Djibouti and Diego Suarez. In view of the USSR's expanding role in the Indian Ocean, French strategists are inclined to assign new importance to France's outposts in the area.

2. The UN

The Pompidou regime can be expected to exhibit in the future the positive side of De Gaulle's ambivalent attitude toward the UN. Were it not for France's permanent seat on the Security Council, De Gaulle would have been tempted to withdraw from the organization in the midst of the Algerians' struggle for independence. As it was, France boycotted the General Assembly's general discussion sessions from 1960 to 1965. De Gaulle's position mellowed in the latter years of his presidency as the role of the Black African states in the General Assembly enhanced the prestige of the French language and of France itself.

The French reservations about the UN were the same that motivated De Gaulle's refusal to accept the supranational institutions that integration enthusiasts attempted to effect through the Common Market. Paris objected to a democratic concept that would give the General Assembly and the Secretariat of the UN power to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states. It had itself resisted what it considered such interference during the Algerian revolt, and on the same grounds it refused to vote sanctions against South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal. Similarly, Paris has not complied with repeated requests to contribute to UN finances for such operations as the policing of Congo-Kinshasa, or even the Middle East force, whose establishment France had approved.

Essentially the French rationale for such a posture is that the small states which can impose their views through weight of numbers lack the

military and economic strength to enforce their will. As a result, many of the resolutions passed by the General Assembly have an irresponsible character that detracts from the prestige of the organization.

The Security Council, on the other hand, recognizes the realities of power by giving five states the veto right, so that the majority cannot impose its views. It functions like a court, to some degree, permitting deliberation and seeking solutions through other means than force. Above all, in French eyes, it has the virtue of including France among the major powers. As far as Paris is concerned, the Security Council is essentially the five permanent members, and their concordance is what determines the measures to be taken in a given situation.

Despite the veto power, France continues to be fearful that efforts will be made to institutionalize peace-keeping operations that may not always coincide with the desires of all the permanent members of the Council. Particularly if such operations require fairly extensive outlays of funds, materiel, and manpower, Paris is inclined to suspect that the UN is being used as a cover for operations essentially national in character.

Paris has long maintained that the UN lacks adequate contact with the real world as long as it refuses to give Peking China's seat. The Charter was signed, France maintains, not by governments, but by states, and membership in the UN should reflect political realities, that is, it should be the prerogative of the government that has effective control of a given country. Even though the presence of the Chinese Communists in New York may complicate debate, it should make peace-keeping easier because the composition of the world organization will be closer to existing conditions in the world itself.

3. The US

In an exposition of French foreign policy before the National Defense Advanced Studies Institute in 1967, Herve Alphand introduced his discussion of differences with the US by a quotation from Jefferson: "Differences of opinion are not differences of principle." France does not question American intentions; but it frequently expresses doubts about specific objectives pursued by Washington and the means adopted to attain them.

In the mid-1960s, De Gaulle seemed to be systematically applying a policy that opposed the US at every turn. In the final years of his administration, however, he seemed to be much more relaxed in his attitude toward the

US. The change reflected his impression that the US had changed both its objectives and its operational approach. When the power at Washington's disposal seemed unlimited and virtually unchallenged, France saw its national interests in resisting American hegemony. As American frustration over the Vietnam impasse generated self-doubt and introspection, France turned back to a more understanding attitude toward the problems Washington faces.

But understanding does not necessarily imply acquiescence in American policy, and the prime consideration for Paris in its dealings with Washington, as with other capitals, is French national interest. This stance is not exclusively Gaullist; in a general sense, of course, it is not exclusively French. Insofar as France is concerned, its antecedents are readily discernible in the period between the end of World War II and De Gaulle's return to power in 1958. Two examples in particular show how each country has thwarted the other when national interests clashed. In rejecting the abortive European Defense Community in 1954, France expressed its determination to maintain a semblance of freedom of action despite the pressure of its powerful ally. In 1956 when France and Great Britain launched an attack on Egypt over the Suez Canal, Washington refused to support its allies against Soviet threats.

France has applied that lesson since; it accepts the Atlantic Alliance as the gauge of its national security against direct Soviet aggression; it is increasingly doubtful, however, that it has absolute confidence in US protection. Its aim, therefore, is to seek good relations with the US and to retain freedom of choice in each new situation it faces.

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